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**The Joint Warfighting Center  
Joint Doctrine Series**

**Pamphlet 3**



***Doctrinal Implications of the  
Standing Joint Force Headquarters  
(SJFHQ)***

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


## Preface

This US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) pamphlet, ***Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters***, is part of a “**Joint Doctrine Series**” intended to facilitate changes to joint doctrine based on the good ideas and other results that emerge from the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Program and related joint doctrine development initiatives. The primary purpose of **JWFC Doctrine Pam 3** is to raise awareness, promote debate, and discuss doctrinal implications associated with the initiative to develop and field Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) in each geographic combatant command.

The SJFHQ initiative is one of USJFCOM’s top transformation priorities and is a key element and catalyst for a transformation in operational-level command and control. By current design, the SJFHQ will be a full-time, trained and equipped, joint command and control element—a part of each geographic combatant commander’s staff. This organization will focus daily on warfighting readiness and will be a fully integrated participant in the staff’s planning and operations. The SJFHQ will enhance the combatant commander’s options to deter or quickly resolve a crisis and reduces the time required to establish a fully functional joint task force headquarters. This will facilitate continuity in planning and operations from peacetime through execution and transition due to the SJFHQ’s understanding of potential crisis areas, its daily operations in a collaborative environment, and the in-place capability to integrate effects-based planning into a range of component and supporting headquarters.

We welcome your comments and ideas on this important topic. Point of contact for JWFC Doctrine Pam 3 is Mr. Rick Rowlett, JW2114, 757-686-6167 (DSN 668), [rowlett@jwfc.jfcom.mil](mailto:rowlett@jwfc.jfcom.mil).



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## The Mission

*"My intent for joint experimentation is to keep the Armed Forces superior to any other nation's—today and tomorrow. . . . Your focus of effort will be on the development of a standing joint force headquarters model no later than the end of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 and capable of implementation by all regional Commanders-In-Chief (CINCs) by FY 05. . . . Support each Combatant Commander in the establishment of a SJFHQ within their region."*

Richard B. Myers  
General, US Air Force  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
in a Memorandum for Commander  
US Joint Forces Command  
2 November 2001

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## Section I — Introduction

*"The Regional Combatant Commanders will establish SJF HQs by FY2005 reflecting standards established by Joint Forces Command and incorporating lessons learned from Millennium Challenge '02."*

Defense Planning Guidance  
Fiscal Years 2004-2009  
May 2002

### Background

**USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Pam 3** is intended to facilitate changes to joint doctrine based on the good ideas and other results that emerge from the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Program and related joint doctrine development initiatives. **The primary purpose of this pamphlet is to raise awareness, promote debate, and discuss doctrinal implications associated with the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ).** The stimulus for this topic is the conceptualization and experimentation conducted by USJFCOM J-9 and the resulting direction from the Secretary of Defense<sup>1</sup> and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>2</sup> to implement an SJFHQ in each geographic combatant command (GCC)<sup>3</sup> by FY 05.

Contents	
Section I:	Background
Section II:	SJFHQ Organization and Employment
Section III:	Enabling Concepts and Capabilities
Section IV:	Doctrinal Implications
Glossary	

<sup>1</sup> Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 2004-2009, May 2002, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command, Subject: *Guidance for USCINCPACOM Joint Experimentation (JE)*, 2 November 2001. The quote that follows the Preface of JWFC Pam 3 is taken from this CJCS memo.

<sup>3</sup> There is a current issue concerning the substitution of "regional combatant command" (RCC) for "geographic combatant command" (GCC). "Geographic combatant command" and "geographic combatant commander" are approved terms used in Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, 10 July 2001. See pp. xvi and III-19 for examples. The term "regional combatant command" has been popularized recently in the *Defense Planning Guidance* and senior leader correspondence. Action is ongoing to resolve which term will prevail. This pamphlet will use **geographic combatant command** and **GCC** until the issue is resolved.



Joint command, control, and related activities can be complex even under the best circumstances. Contingencies that require crisis action planning and quick response with military forces can greatly complicate the efficient formation of an operational joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ). The idea of a “standing” JTF HQ (or elements of such a headquarters) is not new. US Pacific Command’s deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) is an example of a battle-rostered organization comprised principally of GCC staff members and designated Service component staff personnel who are “dual-hatted”—that is, they perform duties associated with a typical headquarters staff position in peacetime and can augment a JTF HQ during a contingency as a member of the DJTFAC. They can assist the JTF HQ in planning and organizing for the contingency, particularly in the early stages of crisis response. This arrangement facilitates planning, increases familiarity with potential operational requirements, and accelerates the efficient formation of a JTF headquarters during contingency operations. Nonetheless, a DJTFAC does not provide the full set of benefits associated with a full-time, trained and ready team such as the SJFHQ.

USJFCOM’s early exploration of ideas for future command and control (C2) culminated in the ***Adaptive Joint Command and Control (AJC2)*** concept white paper.<sup>4</sup> Among a number of alternatives, the AJC2 concept described a redesigned, functionally oriented, standing core headquarters element that would support operational requirements described in the emerging ***Rapid Decisive Operations*** (RDO) concept. **In the AJC2 context, “standing” connoted an organization that would be staffed in peacetime with personnel who would have full-time responsibilities to plan for potential contingency operations, train for those contingencies, and operate as part of a larger headquarters during the actual operation.** The notional C2 core organization in the AJC2 concept focused on a joint plans and operations group, but also contained a joint logistics element, a joint support element, a joint information element, and a joint fires and effects team.

The USJFCOM-sponsored, summer 2000 **RDO Wargame** postulated the potential value of a standing C2 organization.<sup>5</sup> The **UNIFIED VISION 2001** (UV 01) experiment reinforced this in summer 2001 with a finding that a standing C2 element can reduce the “ad-hoc” nature of current JTF organizational methodology.<sup>6</sup> USJFCOM formed a prototype SJFHQ in February 2002 in preparation for the summer 2002 **MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002** (MC 02). On 18 July 2002, just prior to MC 02, USJFCOM J-9 published Version 2.0 of the RDO concept white paper. RDO is an integrating concept that builds on enabling and supporting concepts, like AJC2,



<sup>4</sup> USJFCOM J-9 concept white paper, *Adaptive Joint Command and Control (AJC2)*, Version 1.0, 10 May 2000, p. 2-10.

<sup>5</sup> The RDO Wargame examined the RDO concept and alternative concepts for joint operations in a high-end, small-scale contingency. Senior mentors observing the wargame concluded that a standing C2 element could increase planning efficiency and decrease the time required to form a fully operational JTF headquarters.

<sup>6</sup> UV 01 “Emerging Insights” briefing, 20 Aug 01.

developed over the previous three years of experimentation. The RDO concept has contributed to the foundation for USJFCOM's continued concept development and experimentation.

The investigation of the SJFHQ concept continued in MC 02, July-August 2002. MC 02 was a congressionally mandated, operational-level, joint experiment that combined live forces with virtual and constructive simulation. USJFCOM designed this event to assess the ability of a JTF to execute the RDO warfighting concept in this decade, given a set of enabling and supporting concepts such as SJFHQ. As part of a notional combatant commander's (CCDR)<sup>7</sup> staff, the prototype SJFHQ focused before MC 02 on preparing the operational net assessment (ONA) for the event and on other pre-crisis planning activities, including development of a contingency plan for the operation. During the experiment, the SJFHQ merged into the JTF headquarters.<sup>8</sup> It enhanced the JTF HQ with significant planning augmentation; regional situational awareness and understanding; experience with collaborative tools; and joint operations expertise. Event participants and observers concluded that the SJFHQ provided value-added C2 support to the JTF HQ; reduced the ad hoc nature of activating the JTF; helped surmount the JTF HQ stand-up learning curve; and facilitated continuity in planning and operations through pre-crisis, execution, and transition.



#### MC 02 Hypothesis

**If** an enhanced joint force headquarters is informed by an operational net assessment and employs effects-based operations which utilize the full range of our national capabilities,  
**Then** the 2007 joint force will be able to conduct rapid decisive operations against a determined 2007 adversary.

In November 2002, USJFCOM submitted a "Transformational Change Package" for the SJFHQ to the Joint Staff. This package recommended a number of initiatives in each of the key DOTMLPF areas.<sup>9</sup> USJFCOM awaits JROC final endorsement after extensive staffing of the package with combatant commands, Services, agencies, and the Joint Staff.

<sup>7</sup> Secretary of Defense memorandum dated 24 Oct 02 states that the term "commander in chief" and abbreviation "CINC" will no longer be used to refer to combatant commanders. Action is ongoing to determine an appropriate abbreviation for "combatant commander." USJFCOM JWFC has proposed **CCDR**, and this pamphlet will use this abbreviation pending resolution.

<sup>8</sup> HQ III Corps was designated as the JTF HQ for MC 02.

<sup>9</sup> Per Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3180.01, *Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Programmatic Processes for Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations*, 31 Oct 02. This CJCSI provides policy and procedures for recommending changes to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).

## Key Terms

The SJFHQ is not just an extra group of personnel who accomplish peacetime planning tasks and augment a designated JTF HQ for contingency operations. It is a uniquely structured, cross-functional organization, which employs transformational enabling concepts to accomplish its mission. Section III discusses these concepts in more detail. Since the relationships between these concepts are somewhat complex, following is a brief summary of key terms and constructs to assist in understanding their use throughout the remainder of this pamphlet.

- ***Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)***: A full-time, joint C2 element that is part of the geographic CCDR's staff. The SJFHQ focuses on deliberate and crisis action planning and is a fully integrated participant in the GCC staff's planning and operations activities. The SJFHQ exploits new organizational and operational concepts and technology to enhance the command's peacetime planning efforts, accelerate the efficient formation of a JTF HQ, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force. During contingency operations, the CCDR can employ the SJFHQ in three basic ways, described in Section II.
- ***Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)***: The CIE, a key enabler of the SJFHQ, is the integration of individuals, organizations, systems, and processes for the common purpose of creating and sharing the data, information, and knowledge necessary to rapidly plan, execute, and assess joint operations. The CIE provides a medium that transforms a collection of networks into a "cyber environment" to support mission accomplishment. Specific collaborative tools, organizations, and databases are added to and eliminated from the CIE as the task or mission requires. A common relevant operational picture (CROP) and a joint interactive planning (JIP) capability are two important CIE components. CIE enhancements are intended for all joint forces, not just the SJFHQ.
- ***Operational Net Assessment***: ONA, a key enabler of the SJFHQ, is the integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment and ourselves. A holistic approach is used to understand key relationships, dependencies, and vulnerabilities within and across political, military, economic, social, information and economic systems. From that understanding, leverage points, to include key links and nodes, can be identified to influence adversary capabilities, perceptions, and decision making. Knowledge of the adversary is combined with knowledge of friendly capabilities to develop a range of options from which decision makers can choose to achieve desired outcomes.
- ***Effects-based Planning (EBP)***: **Effects-based planning** represents an enhancement to the current planning process that emphasizes consideration of various effects (physical and/or behavioral changes to a system) that result from applying capabilities associated with the **diplomatic, informational, military, and**

economic (DIME) instruments of national power. EBP uses ONA products to tie specific tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives. This forms the basis of a campaign analysis process that considers the complexity of the modern battlespace and dynamic, adaptive nature of the adversary.

➤ **Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG):** A JIACG, when formed, is composed of US Government (USG) civilian and military experts who are typically located with the combatant command HQ. The JIACG composition is tailored to meet the needs of the supported commander and enhances the CCDR's capability to collaborate with other USG civilian agencies and departments. The SJFHQ typically will collaborate with the JIACG during peacetime ONA development and will facilitate the JTF HQ interface with the JIACG during joint operations.

Although the glossary contains a comprehensive list of abbreviations and acronyms, Table 1 contains those used frequently in this pamphlet.

<b>CCDR</b>	<b>combatant commander</b>
<b>CIE</b>	<b>collaborative information environment</b>
<b>EBP</b>	<b>effects-based planning</b>
<b>GCC</b>	<b>geographic combatant command</b>
<b>JFC</b>	<b>joint force commander</b>
<b>JIACG</b>	<b>joint interagency coordination group</b>
<b>JTF</b>	<b>joint task force</b>
<b>ONA</b>	<b>operational net assessment</b>
<b>SJFHQ</b>	<b>standing joint force headquarters</b>

**Table 1: Key Acronyms**

## The Way Ahead

SJFHQ implementation is a multi-year process of experimentation, concept refinement, and capability development that should culminate in the fielding of an operational SJFHQ in each of the GCCs. Major exercises such as TERMINAL FURY 04 in US Pacific Command and AGILE RESPONSE 04 in US European Command—as well as USJFCOM-generated activities such as limited objective experiments (LOE), workshops, and standing operating procedures (SOP) development—will help refine and validate the SJFHQ organization and concepts. Concurrently, key materiel initiatives, such as the Deployable Joint Command and Control Program, should provide greatly enhanced C2 capabilities for geographic CCDRs as well as the SJFHQ, beginning in FY 05.

From an experimentation perspective, USJFCOM's Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Strategy conducts activities on two pathways—the **Joint Prototype Path**, which focuses on SJFHQ implementation in the near term; and the **Joint Concept Development Path**, which explores a broad range of ideas to address military challenges beyond the near term. Prototype Path concepts and events link directly to the SJFHQ and focus on improving near-term joint warfighting capabilities.

Activities on this path will leverage combatant command exercises and actual operations as well as Service-sponsored wargames and seminars. The Concept Development Path uses iterative experiments and common scenarios to focus on specific “big joint issues.” The results will be packaged as actionable recommendations for senior leader discussion. Activities on this path are tied to various subordinate concepts of the *Joint Operations Concepts* document<sup>10</sup> published by the Joint Staff. The Concept Development Path will contribute to the long-term refinement of SJFHQ capabilities, but some results will have near-term application as well.

Prototype Path Objectives

- Field the SJFHQ, including the enabling concepts for developing transformational joint command and control.
- Pursue rapid prototyping of capabilities to improve joint warfighting now.

Concept Development Path Objectives

- Provide actionable recommendations from experimentation results to senior leaders to inform options for future force investments.

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<sup>10</sup> *Joint Operations Concepts* (JOpsC) is a concept paper developed by the Joint Staff at SECDEF direction. This paper describes how the Armed Forces of the United States will operate 15-20 years from now. It provides the operational context for the transformation of our Armed Forces by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of joint and Service capabilities. It provides the conceptual framework to guide future joint operations and joint, Service, combat support, and defense agency concept development and experimentation. The JOpsC establishes three tiers of subordinate concepts: **joint operating concepts**, **functional concepts**, and **enabling concepts**.

## Section II — SJFHQ Organization and Employment

By current design, the SJFHQ is not staffed in peacetime to be a fully functional, operational headquarters without significant augmentation, mission specific “plugs,” and liaisons. The SJFHQ—described in both the RDO concept and Standing Joint Force headquarters-Prototype (SJFHQ-P)<sup>11</sup> ***Concept of Employment***<sup>12</sup>—is intended to provide each geographic CCCR with a trained and equipped, in-place, joint C2 capability specifically organized to reduce the time required to establish a fully functional JTF HQ. This enables continuity in planning and operations from peacetime through execution and transition due to the SJFHQ’s understanding of potential crisis areas, its use of collaboration tools, and the in-place capability to integrate EBP into a range of component and supporting headquarters.

The SJFHQ is a staff organization operating under direction of a flag officer—the **SJFHQ Director**. It is staffed on a full-time basis with joint-qualified military and civilian personnel who collaboratively plan, prepare, and train with other GCC staff elements and designated component planning cells for specified contingencies within the CCCR’s area of responsibility (AOR). The SJFHQ develops standardized JTF procedures for ONA and EBP within the AOR. Daily operations consist of collaborative planning, preparing, and training with other GCC staff elements and designated component planning cells for specified contingencies. As a crisis develops, this headquarters element will shift rapidly and seamlessly from planning to execution.

The exact composition and location of the SHFJQ could vary among the GCCs. However, the intent is for SJFHQ members to be located together in peacetime rather than dispersed throughout the GCC staff. Advanced collaboration capabilities will facilitate real-time, cross-functional collaboration between SJFHQ members and other organizations. Locations of specific SJFHQ members will vary in a crisis according to the selected employment option.

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
<sup>11</sup> USJFCOM established a prototype, designated SJFHQ-P, in Feb 02. As it did in MC 02, the SJFHQ-P will serve as an experimental “test bed” to refine the enabling concepts and examine organizational and operational alternatives during the period prior to fielding the first operational SJFHQ.

<sup>12</sup> USJFCOM’s Prototype SJFHQ (the SJFHQ-P) is developing this concept. The *Concept of Employment* provides details on the SJFHQ’s organization, functions, and processes. It addresses how the SJFHQ will operate at the GCC headquarters and describes potential crisis employment options.



## SJFHQ Organization

The SJFHQ is functionally aligned into **six administrative groups**: Command, Plans, Operations, Information Superiority (IS), Knowledge Management (KM), and Logistics. The groups are the SJFHQ's day-to-day, in-garrison organizations that maintain administrative responsibility and accountability for their functional areas and provide support to the SJFHQ's **four cross-functional teams**.



**Figure 1. SJFHQ Cross-functional Teams**

These teams—**Operations**, **Planning**, **Information Superiority**, and **Knowledge Management** (Figure 1)—accomplish daily mission requirements. Logisticians from the Logistics Group are members of the Operations and Planning teams. These teams operate within a knowledge-based environment that emphasizes seamless, cross-functional collaboration between the teams, with the GCC staff and components, and with other external military and civilian agencies. Following is a brief description of team functions and tasks.

### *Planning Team*

The Planning Team is the primary SJFHQ interface with the CCDR's planning processes. The Planning Team is task-organized to include members from the other functional groups. It also provides members to the CCDR's joint planning group (JPG) and to the JTF JPG when a JTF is formed. In a crisis, the team's joint expertise, collective situational understanding, and knowledge of the CCDR's intent will facilitate crisis-action planning at the JTF. Integral to the Planning Team, Blue/Red planners provide the commander the ability to understand the developing crisis from the

adversary's and regional perspectives, helping to more effectively identify critical nodes and links relevant to strategic objectives and to identify force capabilities and their deployment sequence to achieve these objectives.

### ***Operations Team***

The Operations Team integrates and synchronizes current operations by monitoring on-going actions through the CIE. The Operations Team's primary responsibilities include gaining and maintaining situational awareness and understanding; assisting in developing and updating the ONA; and assessing the effects achieved against established measures of effectiveness. The team also tracks friendly force readiness with a view toward potential response forces and sustainment requirements. The Operations Team provides continuity in pre-crisis planning, situational understanding, and EBP. When transitioned to a JTF headquarters, the Operations Team's primary responsibilities are in the joint operations center (JOC) where their joint expertise, collective situational understanding, and knowledge of the CCDR's intent will optimize execution of current operations.

### ***Information Superiority Team***

Through the CIE, the Information Superiority Team collaboratively coordinates requirements and synchronizes activities throughout the SJFHQ for ONA, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (JISR), and effects assessment. The IS Team organizes project specific work groups (sub-teams) to accomplish required tasks. A major sub-team (the ONA Team) builds and updates ONA products and is responsible for collaborating with subject-matter experts and incorporating information from various sources, including national agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

### ***Knowledge Management Team***

The KM Team is comprised of the SJFHQ's KM Group, with the addition of a computer network defense specialist. Three knowledge management officers are tasked as matrixed support to the Planning, Operations, and IS teams. When employed as part of a JTF, the KM Team grows to include KM support for the JTF Command Group and Knowledge Request Managers.

### ***Logistics Group***

While the logistical function in the SJFHQ does not have a cross-functional team of its own, integration of logistical expertise into the SJFHQ's Operations and Planning teams is critical to the success of the SJFHQ's mission. The Logistics Group also facilitates coordination with the CCDR's staff and, in conjunction with the GCC J-1 and J-4, plans and executes the essential personnel and logistical functions necessary to ensure effective transportation support to deployment and sustainment of a joint force during contingency operations. The Logistics Group assists in developing the ONA knowledge base, plans for logistics contingencies, monitors daily events, maintains the



logistical portion of the CROP, and trains for actual operations. These activities enable logisticians to acquire a detailed understanding of the logistical infrastructure in the AOR and develop options for common-user logistics. This not only improves logistical support, but also reduces the logistical footprint in a JTF's joint operations area, when designated. When transitioned to a JTF, the Logistics Group provides logistical expertise to the JPG and the JOC and operational coordination with the JTF J-4.




Figure 2: SJFHQ Employment Options

## SJFHQ Employment Options

The SJFHQ-P *Concept of Employment* envisions three possible options for SJFHQ employment during contingency operations (Figure 2). The CCDR's selection depends on the **scope** of the contingency, **scale** of potential contingency response forces, and estimated **duration** of operations.

- **The SJFHQ can form the core of a JTF HQ.** This option typically would be used for small contingencies and requires significant augmentation with mission-specific plugs and appropriate liaison personnel for the SJFHQ to become a fully functional JTF HQ. The CCDR designates the SJFHQ Director or another flag officer as the joint force commander (JFC) for the operation. During UV 01, the

SJFHQ organized and operated as in **Option 1** of Figure 2, with a flag officer designated by the CCCR as the JTF commander. The SJFHQ formed the nucleus of the JTF HQ and was augmented with additional capabilities.

➤ **The SJFHQ can augment a Service component HQ.** During MC 02, the SJFHQ organized and operated as shown in **Option 2**, providing specific “plugs” and augmentees to III Corps HQ. The SJFHQ facilitated the transition of III Corps HQ from peacetime, Service-oriented operations to a fully functional JTF HQ by providing the continuity in planning and operations required to support a rapid, decisive response to the experiment scenario. MC 02 exercised extensive reach-back capabilities to access fixed-base support as well as other resources. Even if the CCCR employs a JTF, but reserves the SJFHQ for another potential contingency, the SJFHQ uses its peacetime planning efforts and collaborative capabilities to facilitate the JTF HQ formation, deployment, and employment.

➤ **The SJFHQ supports the GCC HQ.** In **Option 3**, a CCCR functions as the JFC for the contingency and conducts operations through subordinate Service and functional components and JTFs. Operations are planned and controlled from the GCC HQ. An example would be the recent Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, in which USCENTCOM HQ deployed forward as the joint force headquarters. The SJFHQ could remain as part of the CCCR’s headquarters or could deploy as part of its forward C2 element. The SJFHQ helps the CCCR leverage reach-back capabilities and collaborate with the interagency community IAC and COE.

## Peacetime Operations

As a fully integrated element of the CCCR’s staff in peacetime, the SJFHQ focuses its efforts on prioritized potential contingency areas within the AOR. It develops the information and knowledge necessary to prepare relevant contingency plans. The SJFHQ maintains habitual relationships with key individuals and enabling organizations, which provide expertise in specific areas and specialties. Through the CIE, the SJFHQ also collaborates routinely with supporting and subordinate commands, the IAC, regional allies, and key multinational partners to ensure the conduits for information sharing are fully in place prior to the onset of a crisis. These relationships are established through a network of collaboration early in the planning process and become the basis for expanding the SJFHQ’s core capabilities as a crisis develops. Information technologies, the CROP, collaborative analyses, and decision-making tools enable rapid decision-making. **The following five essential tasks comprise the SJFHQ’s daily peacetime operations:**

### ***Effects-based Planning***

Given the CCDR's direction, the SJFHQ Planning Team supports GCC J-5 deliberate planning efforts to update existing plans and orders as well as develop new plans for potential crisis areas. Pre-crisis planning and assessment focus on gaining situational understanding of each area and identifying key nodes and vulnerabilities. This information is integrated into an ONA knowledge environment and used to support the EBP process.

### ***Maintain Day-to-Day Situational Understanding***

The Operations and IS teams share responsibility for monitoring current events and providing necessary information to support SJFHQ EBP. The CIE is the backbone of this information flow. The Operations and IS teams stay closely tied with the CCDR's JOC and joint intelligence center (JIC), respectively, and complement the efforts of these organizations. In conjunction with other GCC staff elements, the SJFHQ develops a detailed understanding of a selected AOR focus area, enabling it to make significant contributions to the development of the CCDR's Theater Security Cooperation Plan. Guided by this plan, the SJFHQ actively participates in identifying the mission-essential roles for allied and regional partners in effects-based operations (EBO) and collaborates with those partners to help develop enhanced situational awareness and understanding. This collaboration helps identify capabilities the United States does not possess and helps determine how multinational partners could best enhance operations.

### ***Fully Leverage CIE to Enhance C2 Capabilities***

The KM Group works closely with the GCC J-6 staff to operate within the GCC-established CIE. This involves the setup, integration, and deployment of tools, procedures, and partners. At the macro level, the CIE is a web-based environment—with extensive use of enterprise portals—which serves the operational requirements of the GCC staff. The CIE depends on an open architecture to bring together external expertise from centers of excellence (COE) and individual subject matter experts in remote locations into a trusted online community. SJFHQ personnel use the CIE in daily operations to refine procedures, while enhancing the environment by linking new COEs and other IAC members into the CIE.

SJFHQ personnel develop and maintain relationships with key individuals, organizations, and agencies that provide expertise in specific areas and specialties. These relationships are established through collaboration early in the planning process and become the basis for expanding the SJFHQ's core capabilities and situational understanding as a crisis develops. A robust CIE, with an established reach-back system that allows SJFHQ personnel to maintain these relationships during operations, should decrease the size of today's forward C2 footprint. Through the CIE, the SJFHQ links with USG agencies, GCC Service components, and COEs that provide the expertise required for a precise, knowledge-centric response to each contingency.

### ***Build and Maintain ONA Products***

The SJFHQ manages the development of the ONA from inception through execution and transition. The IS Team coordinates the ONA development process, and the remainder of the SJFHQ actively participates. ONA development incorporates information from various sources, including the theater intelligence center, GCC staff and Service components, various governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations, and COEs. Development of a baseline ONA should occur well before a crisis, based on the CCDR's most pressing concerns.

### ***Participate in Training and Exercises***

Internal and external training focuses on applying lessons learned, improving use of collaboration and decision support tools, understanding command relationships, and improving lines of communication. Training occurs not only within the GCC headquarters, but also as part of the CCDR's exercise and engagement activities throughout the AOR. The pre-crisis integration of the SJFHQ with the GCC staff provides an opportunity to train together and develop working relationships essential to efficient staff work and successful joint operations.

## **Crisis Response**

When a crisis occurs, the SJFHQ focuses activities in its five essential task areas on the developing situation. The SJFHQ helps the GCC staff and CCDR identify early indicators and the key nodes and linkages against which early, integrated actions could influence and shape the environment to deter or contain the developing crisis. The SJFHQ monitors deterrent actions and assists in assessing their impact. If the CCDR decides to employ a joint force to resolve the crisis, the SJFHQ could be employed in one of the three options described earlier, although the CCDR could also reserve the entire SJFHQ or a portion of it for another potential contingency. The SJFHQ will continue to use the CIE to link distributed staffs and COEs for intelligence, planning, administration, operations, and logistical support.

The SJFHQ continues to monitor the developing situation by maintaining a physical and virtual presence in the GCC's JOC and JIC. The SJFHQ augments, but does not replace, the members of those centers. The SJFHQ facilitates the initial situational understanding of the crisis action team, supports flexible deterrent options<sup>13</sup> and force enhancement, and prepares to deploy to the crisis area or JTF HQ if required.

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<sup>13</sup> **Flexible deterrent option** is a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the right signal. The flexible deterrent option is the means by which the various deterrent options available to a commander (such as economic, diplomatic, political, and military measures) are implemented into the planning process. JP 1-02.

The Operations and IS Teams inform the remainder of the SJFHQ on current events and infuse that knowledge into planning, ONA refinement, and the CIE.

Once the CCDR decides to form a JTF to respond to a crisis (options 1 or 2 described earlier), the SJFHQ's peacetime ONA, planning efforts, joint expertise, and collaborative capabilities help to significantly reduce the time it takes to form a fully functioning JTF HQ. A robust reach-back system maintains SJFHQ relationships with the GCC staff and other elements during deployment and execution. The SJFHQ's collaborative information grid links it to the GCC HQ, JTF components, COE, and the IAC. This provides the expertise required for a knowledge-centric, precise response to the contingency. For example, by providing augmentation and "plugs" to III Corps HQ during MC 02, the SJFHQ used this same collaboration grid to enable the new JTF HQ to quickly adapt to the joint operations area and contingency requirements.

The SJFHQ supports JTF formation either as an integrated part of its headquarters or from its location at the GCC headquarters. If elements of the SJFHQ deploy, they become an integral part of the JTF HQ, not a separate organization. The specific members of the SJFHQ deployed will be mission tailored. But in general, the SJFHQ will provide a number of capabilities either virtually or physically: expertise in use of the ONA, EBP, effects assessment, and Blue/Red Cell input. SJFHQ augmentation to the JTF is facilitated by the GCC JTF SOP, pre-crisis training and exercises conducted with potential JTF HQ, and relationships the SJFHQ has established with organizations prior to the crisis. When the JTF accomplishes its mission, or when SJFHQ members are no longer required for JTF operations, they will return to the GCC HQ.

## Section III — Enabling Concepts and Capabilities

USJFCOM continues to investigate and refine several concepts and their associated capabilities, which are designed to enhance SJFHQ peacetime and crisis-response operations. These concepts also have the potential to affect the broader functions of planning and C2, as well as their associated communications, computers, and intelligence systems capabilities. In addition to the SJFHQ, USJFCOM has submitted Transformational Change Packages<sup>14</sup> to the Joint Staff J-8 for CIE, ONA, and JIACG.

### Collaborative Information Environment<sup>15</sup>

The CIE, a key enabler of the SJFHQ, is the integration of individuals, organizations, systems, and processes for the common purpose of creating and sharing the data, information, and knowledge necessary to rapidly plan, execute, and assess joint operations. This capability is intended to exist across all levels of joint forces (not just the SJFHQ) to provide a medium that transforms a collection of networks into a common “cyber environment.” Specific collaborative tools, organizations, and databases are brought into and dropped from the CIE as the task or mission requires. The CIE will broaden the knowledge base, improve planning and assessment, and increase the “speed of command.” A **CROP** and a **joint interactive planning capability** are two important CIE-related capabilities.

➤ **Common Relevant Operational Picture:** The CROP is intended as a virtual warehouse of timely, fused, assured, and accurate information, which can be tailored to meet the joint force requirements at all levels and is common to all organizations and individuals involved in the joint operation. The CROP is a primary source (although not the only source) of information for SJFHQ planning in peacetime and execution during crisis response. This virtual warehouse database allows each user to tailor the information displays to present the information relevant to their specific needs. The CROP will be designed to include all of the databases that provide information displayed in the Global Command and Control System’s “common operational picture,” “common tactical

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<sup>14</sup> Footnote 9.

<sup>15</sup> The JROC endorsed the USJFCOM CIE Transformational Change Package on 5 Feb 03 and requested that ASD(C3I) designate a CIE lead agent.

picture,” “single integrated air picture,” and other information sources. SJFHQ planners will integrate CROP information with that obtained from open sources and local JISR activities to form a complete “picture” of information relevant to a specific focus area or operation.

➤ **Joint Interactive Planning (JIP) capability:** JIP includes the collocation of planning applications, data, and people in a shared, virtual workspace. In this virtual location, face-to-face planning collaboration can occur among the right participants just as in a physical environment, regardless of where participants are physically located. Information brought into this environment through tools, aids, and intelligent agents is shared with all participants. The essence of JIP emphasizes shared mission planning, execution and assessment processes, and presentations. Collaboration promotes parallel rather than serial information processing.

## Operational Net Assessment<sup>16</sup>

ONA, a key enabler of the SJFHQ, is the integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves. The goal is to develop the kind of actionable knowledge to help decision-makers focus capabilities when, where, and how needed to achieve desired outcomes. This collaborative process and its products incorporate tools that promote operational- and tactical-level planning, execution, and assessment. ONA products are based on a system-of-systems analysis and understanding of key relationships, dependencies, and vulnerabilities within and across the adversary’s PMESII elements. These products identify leverage points (key nodes and links) that can be used to decisively influence the adversary’s capabilities, perceptions, and decision-making. This assessment, combined with knowledge of friendly capabilities, allows for development of a range of options from which decision makers can choose to achieve desired outcomes.

The ONA is not a substitute for current intelligence, operations, or logistical planning processes and activities. However, it supports EBP and existing processes such as joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace by proposing options expressed in terms of **effect-node-action-resource links** and by deepening the SJFHQ’s knowledge of friendly forces and the adversary. The concept calls for a persistent and habitual collaborative process among subject-matter experts from a wide variety of organizations. ONA is facilitated by CIE; it involves IAC and COE participants as well as traditional military organizations. Once the CCCR identifies a specific focus area, the SJFHQ ONA analysts lead the SJFHQ effort to produce the baseline ONA. The combatant command J-2, JIC, J-5, and JIACG are key players in this process. The three primary products of this process are—

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<sup>16</sup> USJFCOM Draft ONA Transformational Change Package, 1 November 2002.



- A web-based portal to a system-of-systems analysis that examines the adversary's PMESII systems.
- A web-based portal to a net assessment of "blue" and "red" objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
- An ONA relational database application that is populated with linked effects, nodes, actions, and resources. This database contains tools to support planning, operations, effects assessment, and situational awareness functions.

## Effects-based Planning<sup>17</sup>

Effects-based planning is part of a larger conceptual construct called *effects-based operations*. Current concept thinking in USJFCOM defines EBO as ". . . actions that change the state of a system to achieve directed policy aims using the integrated application of select instruments of national power. Moreover, effects-based operations are always part of a national or multinational campaign to translate policy into actions to create a desired end state."<sup>18</sup> EBP is intended to be the process by which EBO plans are constructed. This pamphlet focuses on effects-based planning; the EBO construct will continue to mature in various experimentation venues.

One of the key characteristics of planning at any level is that the process is **effects-based**. For EBP purposes, an **effect** is a **result**—a physical and/or behavioral change in the state of a system caused by an action or set of actions. Effects can be both direct and indirect in nature, with both desirable and undesirable consequences. Joint operations generate effects across the range of military operations and at all levels of war. Direct military effects are often tactical in nature, such as the destruction of one target by a single bomb. Effects can also have strategic consequences. For example, the Russian withdrawal of missiles from Cuba during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was a strategic effect (consequence, result) of military activities (such as the various intelligence-gathering efforts and US naval "quarantine") combined with diplomatic action at the highest levels. While each of the DIME instruments of national power can cause specific effects, EBP considers how to combine their capabilities in a coherent joint campaign to achieve strategic objectives.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> There is no Transformational Change Package specifically for EBP. For a more detailed discussion, see the USJFCOM J-9 Concept White Paper, *Effects-based Operations*.

<sup>18</sup> J-9 concept paper *Effects-based Operations (EBO)*, draft version 2.0, Feb 03; and SJFHQ-P *Concept of Employment*, draft, May 03.

<sup>19</sup> This is not necessarily a new construct. Military planners have habitually thought in terms of "effects," particularly in regard to those associated with employment of specific weapons. However, joint doctrine's discussion of effects is sporadic—JP 3-0 covers *effects assessment* and JP 3-60 discusses *effects-based targeting*. USJFCOM has submitted a recommendation to include a more comprehensive discussion of the effects-based nature of planning in JP 5-0, currently under revision.



EBP relies on **effect-node-action-resource links** developed during the ONA process. The challenge to making the EBP process work begins with clearly identifying and linking operational objectives (what we want to achieve) contained in the OPORD to desired operational effects (what changes in adversary behavior or environment need to occur to achieve our objectives) and, ultimately, to directed *actions* (DIME activities that will result in achieving a desired effect) against specific nodes. Effects should be worded to describe a desired **physical or behavioral change** in the state of an adversary's PMESII systems and environment that will achieve our objectives as the result of our DIME actions. Table 2 provides examples.

<u>Example</u>	
<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> Eliminate international terrorist organization in Country X.	
<b>DESIRED EFFECTS (samples):</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Terrorists unable to conduct military or criminal activities in Country X (change in <b>behavior</b> or <b>capability</b>)</li> <li>➤ Terrorists no longer use Country X as a sanctuary (change in <b>system</b>)</li> </ul>	
<b>OPERATIONAL TASK (OT), SUBTASKS (OS) and TACTICAL TASKS (TT) (samples)</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <b>OT:</b> Defeat transnational terrorism in Country X <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>OS 1:</b> Destroy terrorist group "A"</li> <li>○ <b>OS 2:</b> Destroy terrorist group "B" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>TT 1:</b> Destroy group "B" sustainment structure</li> <li>▪ <b>TT 2:</b> Disrupt group "B" C4ISR</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>	

**Table 2: Sample EBP Objective, Effects, Tasks**

**Effects assessment** is essential. The current planning process includes identification or development of relevant **battle damage assessment** measures—those typical indicators of physical effects resulting from direct attack of targets by military means. JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, and JP 2-01.1, *JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting*, contain information on this process. From a broader perspective, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, provides joint doctrine on **combat assessment**—the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Planners must consider relevant **effectiveness and performance measures** that will indicate progress toward accomplishing tasks and achieving a wide range of effects. How will a JFC know if and when terrorist group "B" has been destroyed in the example above? How does the JFC determine if the task requires additional attack measures? Effects assessment becomes more complex when ways and means of the other instruments of national power are employed in conjunction with military capabilities to achieve specific effects. Effects assessment broadens the current combat assessment process by focusing not only on the results of specific tasks, but also on the subsequent changes that occur in adversary systems and behavior as they relate to campaign objectives.

In summary, EBP seeks to link mission-specific policy aims to tactical actions, providing greater clarity for the desired outcome of each action. By design, this process ties specific tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives, forming the basis of a campaign analysis process that considers the complexity of the modern battlespace and dynamic, adaptive nature of the adversary.

## Joint Interagency Coordination Group<sup>20</sup>

Applying the full range of the instruments of national power in a coherent manner requires capabilities beyond those in the Department of Defense. These capabilities reside in other departments and agencies of the government—representing the other instruments of national power—that have not historically fused their efforts into coherent interagency operations. The JIACG can provide a multi-functional, advisory element that can facilitate information sharing, planning and coordination, and political-military synthesis across the IAC for the CCDR and staff. A typical JIACG would include links to the theater Ambassadors and their Country Teams. The JIACG's primary role is to bridge the gap between civilian and military agency operational campaign planning efforts for regional engagement and potential regional crises. Information on the JIACG has been included in JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, during the current revision process.

## Focused Logistics<sup>21</sup>

Focused Logistics is the ability to provide a joint force with the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity. This is possible through a real-time, web-based information system that provides total asset visibility as part of a CIE, effectively linking the operator and logistician across Services and support agencies. Six key tenets emphasize a systematic, relational approach in developing the logistics template for future joint warfare support:

- Joint Theater Logistics Management
- Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution
- Information Fusion
- Multinational Logistics
- Force Medical Protection
- Agile Infrastructure

If fully implemented, these six tenets will provide an improved link between operations and logistics, resulting in precise, time-definite delivery of assets to the joint force. Of these six tenets, the **Logistics CROP** enabling concept facilitates information fusion. It provides logisticians with timely, fused, accurate and relevant logistics and deployment information that can be tailored to the user's requirements and format. Achievement of these focused logistics tenets can also be facilitated by the Logistic Coordination Board, which is used by SJFHQ logisticians as a focal point for collaborative interaction to coordinate, synchronize, and inform the logistics community.

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<sup>20</sup> USJFCOM submitted a JIACG Transformational Change Package to the Joint Staff on 20 November 2002.

<sup>21</sup> There is no Transformational Change Package specifically for Focused Logistics. For a more detailed discussion, see the USJFCOM J-9 Concept White Paper, *Focused Logistics: Enabling Early Decisive Operations*, 10 October 1999.

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## Section IV — Doctrinal Implications

This section explores some of the potential joint doctrine implications associated with fielding SJFHQ in each GCC. Central to this discussion is the question—is **current joint doctrine sufficient in its treatment of this emerging capability?**

### Current Doctrine Summary

Understandably, a search through current joint doctrine for the new term “**standing joint force headquarters**” and acronym “**SJFHQ**” produces no results. However, some references embody the philosophy of having a cell of experts available to augment a JTF HQ. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, states, “Often an establishing authority has a ‘cell’ of experts prepared to augment a JTF to provide assistance in the early stages of organization and planning.”<sup>22</sup> The text then mentions US Pacific Command’s **DJTFA**C and US European Command’s **core JTF cell**. Various figures in JP 5-00.2 reflect DJTFA C augmentation in the JPG and depict potential DJTFA C sub-elements such as an **operations planning team** and a **joint training team**.<sup>23</sup> There are also isolated references to the DJTFA C in a few other JPs as well as in some important non-doctrinal documents such as the *Universal Joint Task List* (UJTL)<sup>24</sup> and the *Combatant Command Headquarters Master Training Guide*.<sup>25</sup>

### Perspectives

From one perspective, fielding the SJFHQ might have little impact on joint doctrine. The Defense Planning Guidance calls for establishing only five SJFHQ, one in each GCC. Although staffing requirements will vary between GCCs, SJFHQs will be relatively small since each is a C2 planning element, not a full headquarters. Even though the enabling capabilities such as CIE and ONA are important, one could argue that a fielded SJFHQ could establish relevant links, relationships, and protocols—using

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<sup>22</sup> JP 5-00.2, *JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures*, 13 January 1999, p. II-4.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. Figure IX-5 on p. IX-8; Figure IX-6 on p. IX-9; Figure IX-8 on p. IX-11.

<sup>24</sup> CJCSM 3500.04C, 1 July 2002.

<sup>25</sup> CJCSM 3500.02, 16 January 2002.

current capabilities and doctrinal processes—which would allow it to accomplish its essential functions. Even without fully developed enabling capabilities, a permanently staffed, full-time SJFHQ will be more responsive to the CCDR's planning and employment requirements than a part-time, battle-rostered body such as a DJTFAC. Thus, although GCC HQ and JTF SOPs will require adjustments to accommodate the SJFHQ, key joint doctrine publications such as JP 5-00.2 could require only minor changes to reflect the role of the SJFHQ in the GCC HQ during peacetime and crisis response.

*"The SJFHQ is, in effect, a uniquely structured organization that is further enabled by the capabilities of transformational concepts validated by MC02 or in development. These concepts: collaborative information environment (CIE); operational net assessment (ONA); effects-based operations (EBO); and joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) demonstrated their capabilities during Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02). These capabilities were focused on providing the joint warfighter with the ability to conduct rapid decisive operations in this decade. Each of the attendant concepts' capabilities demonstrated value during MC02. Nevertheless, the transformational benefits of SJFHQ, which significantly increased joint force readiness and operational effectiveness, depend on a synergistic application of these concepts within the construct of the SJFHQ organization."*

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From USJFCOM's perspective, however, the SJFHQ should be developed as a "package" of capabilities rather than simply as a group of additional personnel. And although the initial, near-term focus of enabling capabilities such as CIE, ONA, and EPB is on the SJFHQ, **these enablers are intended for implementation across all joint force echelons.** Thus there are potentially far-ranging implications for joint operations associated with these capabilities. **Following are examples of issues that the joint doctrine community might have to consider in future joint doctrine assessment and development.**

➤ **Organization.** The SJFHQ Prototype, residing in USJFCOM's Joint Warfighting Center, will continue to investigate and refine the innovative organizational construct summarized in Section II and covered in detail in the SJFHQ *Concept of Employment* and SOP. The SJFHQ concept does not propose changing the JTF J-staff structure to a new functional organization. However, if continuing experimentation validates this construct, then there could be implications concerning whether it has broader application at the JTF HQ and higher-level joint headquarters. Should we consider revising the traditional J-staff structure at the JTF HQ, or perhaps even the combatant command HQ

staff arrangements? Without doctrinal changes, a Service component HQ might be able to assimilate SJFHQ personnel efficiently into a traditional structure (Figure 2, Option 2). However, there could be doctrinal issues concerning how the SJFHQ's unique organizational structure would assimilate augmentees if the CCDR designates the SJFHQ as the JTF HQ (Figure 2, Option 1). For example, the SJFHQ's IS Group and IS Team coordinate and synchronize activities and requirements for ONA, JISR, information operations, and effects assessment throughout the SJFHQ. In a traditional JTF HQ, the J-2/JIC, J-3/JOC, and J-5/JPG perform these functions. At a minimum, there would seem to be significant training and education requirements regardless of the employment option selected.

➤ **Peacetime Planning.** A primary task for the SJFHQ in peacetime is to build and maintain ONAs for specified contingencies. This important process and its products support both peacetime and crisis-action, effects-based planning and operations. According to the USJFCOM's ONA Transformational Change Package,<sup>26</sup> ONA implementation requires—

- Interagency community support for fielding a JIACG in each GCC.
- Full cooperation of the IAC in sharing common, interoperable databases and other elements of information.
- Establishment of a network of COEs to conduct detailed analysis in each operational domain.
- A national information fusion and assessment capability.
- Advanced analytical tools to deal with the volume of information and to understand potential cause-and-effect links.

Whether or not the above arrangements and capabilities will eventually emerge is problematic. For example, the JIACG has demonstrated its usefulness in both MC 02 and in actual operations within various GCCs, but its long-term fielding status is unclear. Likewise, the relationship between projected ONA processes and existing intelligence processes—as they support the planning function—requires additional experimentation and assessment. Also at issue is whether the conceptual effects-based planning process, if validated, will change any of the steps or procedures of the planning process described in current joint doctrine or in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.<sup>27</sup>

➤ **Crisis Action Planning.** Supported by ONA products and a CIE, EBP seems to be the centerpiece of the early stages of crisis response. During this period, the daily roles and responsibilities of the SJFHQ shift to focus on the

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<sup>26</sup> ONA Transformational Change Package, 1 November 2002, p. 7.

<sup>27</sup> The CJCSM 3122 series.



crisis and expand to become an integral part of the overall GCC staff's crisis response. In MC 02, III Corps experimented with a web-based "effects tasking order" (ETO)—a product of ONA and EBP—as a replacement for the traditional operation order. The ETO is intended to be developed using decision aids and collaboration tools, which allow joint force planners at distributed locations to collaborate in real time, significantly reducing planning timelines. Further experimentation should help determine the utility of the ETO compared to the traditional operations order.

## Conclusions

Experimentation and analysis to date indicate that the SJFHQ will constitute a significant enhancement to the GCC CCDR's staff. With limited enabling capabilities, however, **changes to joint doctrine might be minimal**. For example, a JP 5-00.2 revision could acknowledge the SJFHQ just as the current JP briefly discusses the DJTFAC. Each GCC could modify local SOPs to describe how the SJFHQ would be integrated into the command's peacetime operations and how it would be employed during contingencies, given the unique circumstances in each GCC.

**However, an SJFHQ fully enhanced with mature enabling capabilities (CIE, ONA, etc.) could have a greater impact on joint doctrine, perhaps due more to the ripple effect of the enabling capabilities than to the organization itself.** For example, the power of a collaborative information environment is not that the capabilities exist just in the SJFHQ, but that they can reside throughout the joint and interagency communities. Regardless of the actual tools used, the need to improve multi-level planning collaboration to facilitate EBP is a goal we should continue to pursue. Likewise, if an innovative organizational structure in the SJFHQ proves to be "value-added" compared to today's traditional functional arrangements, then the joint doctrine community should investigate how this structure could apply to the JTF and other joint HQ as well. USJFCOM has already submitted a discussion of effects-based planning for incorporation in the Final Coordination Draft of JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, currently under revision.

Issues remain concerning SJFHQ staffing requirements. At a 21 Mar 03 briefing to the Joint Requirements Board, USJFCOM was asked to work with the GCCs to more precisely identify their specific personnel requirements. The specific staffing numbers and required skill sets and mix are expected to vary somewhat among the GCCs. Also, personnel availability and funding constraints might drive SJFHQ resourcing toward an interim "hybrid" option in which some personnel are "dual-hatted" between the SJFHQ and another GCC HQ staff element while the remainder of the SJFHQ complement is designated as full-time. This "hybrid" staffing option is an interim solution designed to minimize near-term manpower costs, with the intention of eventually staffing the SJFHQ only with full-time personnel.

Further experimentation and concept refinement, reinforced by lessons learned from actual operations such as "IRAQI FREEDOM," should help clarify and resolve these issues. During this period, the joint doctrine community's doctrine development and revision efforts should actively seek the "low-hanging fruit" from joint experimentation and assess these new ideas and capabilities for their potential application in joint doctrine. For example, the revision of JP 5-00.2 is scheduled to begin with a formal assessment in October 2003. The assessment and subsequent revision should consider any SJFHQ-related issues, including those from the enabling concepts, which could affect the organization and functions of a JTF HQ.

**USJFCOM JWFC welcomes comments on these and other perspectives concerning the potential impact of the SJFHQ and enabling concept development on joint doctrine.**



## ***Glossary***

### **Part I — Abbreviations and Acronyms**

AJC2	adaptive joint command and control
AOR	area of responsibility
C2	command and control
CCDR	combatant commander
CIE	collaborative information environment
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNA	computer network attack
COA	course of action
COE	center of excellence
CROP	common relevant operational picture
DIME	diplomatic, informational, military, economic
DJTfAC	deployable joint task force augmentation cell
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
EBO	effects-based operations
EBP	effects-based planning
ETO	effects-tasking order
GCC	geographic combatant command
IAC	interagency community
IS	information superiority
JFC	joint force commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIC	joint intelligence center
JIP	joint interactive planning
JISR	joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JOC	joint operations center
JOpsC	<i>Joint Operations Concepts</i>
JP	joint publication
JPG	joint planning group
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center

KM	knowledge management
LOE	limited objective experiment
MC 02	MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002
ONA	operational net assessment
PFJO	<i>Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations</i>
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information
RDO	rapid decisive operations
SJFHQ	standing joint force headquarters
SOP	standing operating procedure
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
USG	United States Government
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
UV 01	UNIFIED VISION 2001

## **Part II — Terms and Definitions**

**collaborative information environment (CIE).** The CIE, a key enabler of the SJFHQ, is the integration of individuals, organizations, systems, and processes for the common purpose of creating and sharing the data, information, and knowledge necessary to rapidly plan, execute, and assess joint operations.

**common relevant operational picture (CROP).** A virtual warehouse of timely, fused, assured, and accurate information, which can be tailored to meet the joint force requirements at all levels and is common to all organizations and individuals involved in the joint operation.

**effects-based planning (EBP).** An enhancement to the current planning process that emphasizes consideration of the various effects (physical and/or behavioral changes in the state of a system) caused by an action or set of actions that result from application of capabilities associated with the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic).

**joint interagency coordination group (JIACG).** A multifunctional advisory group composed of US Government (USG) civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and typically located with the GCC headquarters. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

**operational net assessment (ONA).** ONA, a key enabler of the SJFHQ, is a process that promotes situational understanding of friendly capabilities, the adversary, how adversaries view themselves and us, and the operational environment.

**standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ).** A full-time, joint, command and control (C2) element that is part of the geographic CCDR's staff.



*“Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. An ability to adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty are the defining characteristics of our new security environment.”*

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Remarks to the National Defense University  
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